[Collaborative notes taken by Tom, Nat, Kevin et al. EAOE.]
Introduction – two communities at the front-lines of having to deal with the issues going on in this conference are homeland securty and the military.
Tara Lemmey – What does homeland securty look like in the information age and how do we do it in way that holds privacy and civil liberties together. Strong recommendations on how we change the national security infrastructure. We were very successful in getting executive orders and legislation passed to get this stuff done. “What we’re showing you has been mandated into law”.
The FBI agent in chicago calls in information fron chicago. want to get information into the system as quickly as possible. Speech to text, we then edit it. The technology is simple, but the concepts underlying it are very different. When we first did this project the documents had to go up the chain, wildly redacted before they got anywhere. We recommended a ‘right to share’ document. How do you write a document that handles levels of secrecy as well as on various audit-trails to help people go about what information is trustworthy. Looked to Ebay to check reputation kind of stuff.
We had to explain the publish and subscribe model. Documents go out in a distributed way to subscribers to it. if something really vital was happening it would be quick to escalate it.
Four months later a CIA agent in Kabul gets information about a microbiologist. Right now, those two bits of paper (the one from FBI and this one) might not meet together. Likely that they won’t.
In our fictional world the Joint Terrorism task force gets the information and can read it because he’s subscribed to it – probably about Chicago but might be about bio. Gets related documents pushed to him. he wants to connect the documents. Computers can do fuzzy linking, but you really need humans to make judgments.
The DHS are doing federated network search – watching what people are looking for. When she submits them she can see what’s going on in the activity space – chatter of the network normally at the external stuff. (Presented like Flickr tagspace – very cool). She sees a spike in usage in one particular type of conversation, see’s who the experts are, makes an ad hoc team.
What are the critical points of action, do you have enough information to do something, what do you need to get it.
People send out information to people, asking questions around this kind of stuff. And then sending out information out to the USDA or to state local law enforcement. Trying to increase the signal ta the edge
Producing a case report.
That gets sent upstairs – that’s the end of this part of the representation. 5/10/15,000 instances of this kind of activity happen every day. The FBI is leading in a lot of ways, because their old system was failing and they had to reconceive it.
The big issues are looking at the cultural issues. having a positive effect on policy, but culture is the hardest bit. what do distributed organisations look like culturally and how do you encourage positive behaviour. Also who are you recruiting and what does this look for going on in the future.
Also greater privacy challenges arising out of this stuff.
= Meeting the challenges of a new competitive landscape =
= Navy Commander Greg Glaros, Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation =
Find a direct way of getting to the defence department. ‘because our business model wasn’t working’
new concepts of operations.
This is the world through the lens in which we see it – globalisation II – containment strategies. New rules – globalisation III — are about connectedness. Security = Defense + All Else. From industrial age to information age.
Finding ourselves – the people today in Iraq will be the statesmen of the next generation, because they’re seeing how things work now.
Old way: shouting at each other on battlefields against known opponents. (low liklihood, low vulnerability – preserve advantags in force
prefers Iraq to washignton as you knwo who’s shooting at you
low vulnerability high iklihood – insurgents in Iraq – intelligence needed – how do you out-adapt enemy
High vulnerability and liklihood – catstrophic – 9/11 – deflect ultra terrorism
high likelihood low vuln: disruptive – cyber attacks avoid trategic surprise.
3 blocks war – complex, distributed, adaptive
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